Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention

Simple item page
dc.creatorMitnick, E. J.
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-19T16:27:21Z
dc.date.available2013-09-19T16:27:21Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.descriptionThe question addressed in this article is whether state-imposed reputational harm, in itself, should be deemed a deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger procedural due process protection. In a sense, this is an odd question to ask. The Supreme Court, more than thirty years ago, clearly responded in the negative, requiring that state-caused stigmatic harm be accompanied by some more tangible loss for a procedural due process claim to arise. Despite much critical commentary in the wake of that decision, the Court has since not only affirmed but extended its stigma-plus doctrine. This article suggests that the stigma-plus standard should be reconsidered for two reasons.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11212/992
dc.identifier.urihttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1507259_code699328.pdf?abstractid=1365390&mirid=1
dc.publisherThomas Jefferson School of Law
dc.subjectChild abuse
dc.subjectGang-youth
dc.subjectOffender
dc.subjectlegal
dc.titleProcedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention
dc.typeText

Files

Collections

CALiO Collection of Resources