2013-09-192013-09-192009http://hdl.handle.net/11212/1005http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1527569_code629882.pdf?abstractid=1527569&mirid=1In Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, the United States Supreme Court created a serious hurdle in prosecuting certain kinds of crimes, such as domestic violence, elder abuse, and child abuse. Part II of this article briefly describes the Crawford debacle, arguing that its cure was worse than the problem it addressed. However, there is no point belaboring the issue because, as the Court appears to be refining its analysis, it shows no sign of taking another dramatic turn in the near future. Consequently, Part III focuses on the most serious problem created under Crawford: the prosecution of crimes involving vulnerable witnesses, particularly crimes of domestic violence, elder abuse, and child abuse. Focusing on the pragmatics of coping with Crawford, this article suggests ways to overcome Crawford s limitations on admissibility of evidence and ways to exclude evidence that is no longer protected by the Confrontation Clause after Crawford.Child abuseLaw -- federallegalText