2013-09-192013-09-192009http://hdl.handle.net/11212/992http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1507259_code699328.pdf?abstractid=1365390&mirid=1The question addressed in this article is whether state-imposed reputational harm, in itself, should be deemed a deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger procedural due process protection. In a sense, this is an odd question to ask. The Supreme Court, more than thirty years ago, clearly responded in the negative, requiring that state-caused stigmatic harm be accompanied by some more tangible loss for a procedural due process claim to arise. Despite much critical commentary in the wake of that decision, the Court has since not only affirmed but extended its stigma-plus doctrine. This article suggests that the stigma-plus standard should be reconsidered for two reasons.Child abuseGang-youthOffenderlegalProcedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-InventionText