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Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention

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dc.creator Mitnick, E. J.
dc.date.accessioned 2013-09-19T16:27:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-09-19T16:27:21Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11212/992
dc.identifier.uri http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1507259_code699328.pdf?abstractid=1365390&mirid=1
dc.description The question addressed in this article is whether state-imposed reputational harm, in itself, should be deemed a deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger procedural due process protection. In a sense, this is an odd question to ask. The Supreme Court, more than thirty years ago, clearly responded in the negative, requiring that state-caused stigmatic harm be accompanied by some more tangible loss for a procedural due process claim to arise. Despite much critical commentary in the wake of that decision, the Court has since not only affirmed but extended its stigma-plus doctrine. This article suggests that the stigma-plus standard should be reconsidered for two reasons.
dc.publisher Thomas Jefferson School of Law
dc.subject Child abuse
dc.subject Gang-youth
dc.subject Offender
dc.subject legal
dc.title Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention
dc.type Text


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