Computer-Generated Child Pornography - Exposing Prejudice in Our First Amendment Jurisprudence?

Date

1998

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Seton Hall Law Review

Abstract

By prohibiting computer-generated images that appear to be of a child, Congress is attempting to do more than just protect the children victimized by participation in the child pornography industry. Through such a prohibition, Congress has sought to protect society from the evils believed to be inherent in the possession and future use of these computer-generated sexually explicit materials. Congress's sole and primary purpose in passing statutes banning child pornography is, and should be, to prevent children from suffering the harms linked to their participation in child pornography – not to protect society as a whole. Although this desire to protect society is no doubt genuine, the resulting censorship is impermissible. What this Note attempts to demonstrate with respect to computer-generated child pornography is the likelihood that, under the new changes to the federal child pornography statutes, mere creators and possessors of inherently harmless, expressive material will be subject to criminal punishment. Moreover, the lasting effect of such a prohibition will deter artists and other image creators from producing serious works that portray minors in sexually explicit ways. This type of governmental suppression, and correlative self censorship, is precisely what the First Amendment should prevent. Therefore, unless there is some strong, empirical proof that the existence of computer-generated child pornography is directly injurious to the overall well being of our youth, there is no satisfactory justification for such a clear infringement of our constitutional guarantees. (Author Conclusion)

Description

Keywords

child abuse, artistic imagery, freedom of speech, Legal Issues, policy

Citation

Lodato, Vincent. (1998). Computer-Generated Child Pornography - Exposing Prejudice in Our First Amendment Jurisprudence? Seton Hall Law Review, 28(4), 1328-1364.

DOI