"Children and the Law: Constitutional Decisionmaking and the “Peculiar Vulnerability of Children”
Abstract
In 2016, in the juvenile sentencing case of Montgomery v. Louisiana,2 the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that “children are constitutionally different from adults.” Few would disagree with the notion that children differ from adults in many ways. At times, courts have determined that those differences justify—indeed require— differential treatment of children and adults under the Constitution. In its decisions, the Court has identified “three reasons” for treating children differently under the Constitution. It has cited “the peculiar vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”3 While much attention has been paid in recent decades to the latter two factors, there has been comparatively little analysis of how notions of children’s vulnerability relate to constitutional decisionmaking. Here, I focus attention on the concept of children’s vulnerability, examples of which abound in constitutional jurisprudence, despite the absence of substantial discussion of its meaning, parameters, and relevance to constitutional decisionmaking. (Author Text)
Description
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Keywords
judges, juvenile sentencing, vulnerable youth, case study, child abuse, child protection, jurisprudence, legal opinion
Citation
Weithorn, Lois A. (2018). "Children and the Law: Constitutional Decisionmaking and the “Peculiar Vulnerability of Children”," The Judges' Book: Vol. 2 , Article 4.